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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce entered in the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on
July 3, 1989.

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this

appeal pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether under the facts of this case, the trial court

abused its discretion by awarding the Defendant temporary alimony
in the amount of $1,100.00 per month.
2.

Whether the trial court erred in its characterization of

certain property as non-marital property.
3.

Whether the trial court erred in the value ascribed to

certain marital property.
4.

Whether under the facts of this case, the property

awarded to the Defendant constituted an abuse of the trial court's
discretion.
5.

Whether under the facts of this case, the trial court

abused its discretion by not awarding the Defendant her attorney's
and expert witness fees.
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
All determinative authority is included in the Addendum as
Exhibit A and by reference made a part hereof.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 28, 1987, Anthony W. Rudman, Plaintiff, Respondent
and Cross-Appellant (Mr. Rudman), filed a complaint against Evelyn
W. Rudman, Defendant, Appellant and Cross-Respondent (Mrs. Rudman),
seeking a decree of divorce and a division of the property and
obligations of the parties.

Record at 2-8.

On May 7, 1987, Mrs.

Rudman filed an answer and counterclaim against Mr. Rudman seeking
a decree of divorce, an equitable division of the property and
obligations of the parties, temporary and permanent alimony and
attorney's fees.

Record at 27-35.

On September 29, 1987, the trial court awarded Mrs. Rudman
temporary alimony in the amount of $1,500.00 per month. Record at
102 and 117-8.

On three separate occasions, Mrs. Rudman was

required to file a motion to have the trial court order Mr. Rudman
to pay the temporary alimony and hold him in contempt.

Record at

109, 156 and 196. During the course of discovery, Mrs. Rudman was
required to file two motions to compel Mr. Rudman's responses to
discovery requests.

Record at 136 and 279.

In each case, Mr.

Rudman was not ordered to pay Mrs. Rudman's attorney's fees for
having to bring those motions.

2102036.PL2
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The trial of this action commenced on August 18, 1988, before
the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, District Judge.

During the

morning session of the trial, Mr. Rudman presented evidence and the
trial court heard argument from counsel for both of the parties
regarding a prenuptial agreement entered into by the parties.
Exhibit 41.1

At the request of the parties, the trial court

immediately ruled on whether the prenuptial agreement was ambiguous
and whether parole evidence was necessary to determine the intent
of the parties with respect thereto.

The trial court ruled that

the prenuptial agreement was not ambiguous and that parole evidence
was not required for the trial court to interpret the prenuptial
agreement.

Based on the trial court's ruling, the parties moved

to continue the trial so that additional discovery could be
conducted and additional preparation could be made.

Transcript,

Vol. I, p. 53-61.2
On August

22, 1988, the trial

court

issued

Clarification regarding the prenuptial agreement.
7.3

its Ruling

Record at 244-

After several continuances, the trial resumed on April 4, 5,

*A copy of the Prenuptial Agreement is attached as Exhibit E.
2

The transcript consists of five volumes. Subsequent citation
to the transcript will be referenced by volume and page number.
3

A copy of the Ruling Clarification is attached as Exhibit F.

210203G.PL2
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11 and 12, 1989.

On April 28, 1989, the trial court issued its

Memorandum Decision.

Record at 350-60.4

Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree
of Divorce were submitted to the trial court by Mr. Rudman's
counsel on June 20, 1989. Record at 377-96. After retaining new
counsel, Mrs. Rudman filed a Notice of Objection to Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce on
June 28, 1989.

Record at 370-3.

The trial court denied the

modifications requested by Mrs. Rudman to the proposed pleadings.
On July 3, 1989, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce.

Record at 377-96.5 On

August 1, 1989, Mrs. Rudman filed a Notice of Appeal.
399-400.
Appeal.

Record at

On August 14, 1989, Mr. Rudman filed a Notice of Cross
Record at 406-7.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Mrs. Rudman and Mr. Rudman were married on April 18, 1981, in
Sun Valley, Idaho. The marriage followed ten years of acquaintance
including five years of dating. Vol. IV, p. 45-6.

The Decree of

Divorce was entered on July 3, 1989, after over eight years of
marriage.

Record at 392-6.

4

A copy of the Memorandum Decision is attached as Exhibit B.

5

A copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Divorce are attached as Exhibits C and D, respectively.
210203G.PL2
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Both parties had previously been married and divorced. Vol.
II, p. 14 and Vol. IV, p. 46. At the time of her marriage to Mr.
Rudman, Mrs. Rudman was receiving $1,100.00 per month in alimony
from her former husband.

Vol. IV, p. 46.

Prior to the marriage, Mrs. Rudman had numerous conversations
with Mr. Rudman about her concerns that her alimony would terminate
upon remarriage, and about her inability to adequately support
herself

if this marriage should fail.

judgment, Mrs. Rudman sought legal counsel.

Not trusting her own
Vol. IV, p. 47-51.

After consultation with legal counsel, a prenuptial agreement
was prepared by Mrs. Rudman's counsel and entered into by the
parties on April 15, 1981. Vol. IV, p. 51-2 and Exhibit 41. Mrs.
Rudman's motivation for entering into the prenuptial agreement was
to forestall any difficulty with Mr. Rudman's children attempting
to disrupt the marriage. Vol. IV, p. 52. The prenuptial agreement
did not describe or define the premarital property of either party
other than a condominium owned by Mr. Rudman.

Exhibit 41.

Upon Mrs. Rudman's marriage to Mr. Rudman, alimony payments
from her former spouse terminated.

Vol. IV, p. 54.

At the time

of the marriage, Mrs. Rudman had just received her insurance
license and was preparing to pursue a career in insurance sales.
Mr. Rudman objected to Mrs. Rudman pursuing her new career due to
the fact that she would be away from the home in the evening and

2102036.PL2
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she was assigned to a male trainer. Mr. Rudman requested that Mrs.
Rudman immediately terminate that career, which she did. Vol. IV,
p. 55.
Mrs. Rudman has a high school education and one year of
training as a nurse.

She has obtained no degree or license other

than the insurance license. During her first marriage, Mrs. Rudman
worked

as

a

babysitter,

a

telephone

operator,

a

specialty

advertising salesperson and performed other general office work,
all at minimum wage.

Vol. IV, p. 55-58.

Subsequent to her first divorce, Mrs. Rudman established and
operated a telephone answering service.

The business was sold in

1976 for $80,000.00. Vol. IV, p. 58. From the time the business
was sold until her marriage to Mr. Rudman in 1981, Mrs. Rudman
supported herself from interest and dividend earnings on incomeproducing assets that had been acquired as the result of her sale
of the business and her prior home.

Vol. IV, p. 59.

Mrs. Rudman

also operated a diet center and a housecleaning business during the
course of the marriage.

Vol. IV, p. 59-60.

Neither business

generated more than nominal income. Vol. V, p. 14-21 and Exhibits
97-101.
During the course of the marriage, Mr. Rudman did not give
Mrs. Rudman any money for the operation of the household or for her
own use and personal expenses. Vol. IV, p. 60-1. As the level of

2102036.PL2
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interest income earned from her investments declined, due to the
falling interest rates experienced in the mid-1980's as compared
to the late 1970's and early 1980', Mrs. Rudman was forced to use
her cash assets and attempt to secure other employment to support
herself. Vol. IV, p. 59-64.
At the time of the marriage, Mrs. Rudman had in excess of
$195,000.00 in liquid income-producing assets. Vol. V, p. 6-8 and
Exhibit 94.
Id.

She also had $17,000.00 of equity in an automobile.

At the time of divorce, Mrs. Rudman had $8,820.16 in liquid

income-producing

assets and a residence in Logan, Utah, with

equity, as found by the trial court, of approximately $67,500.00.
Id. and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 20.e.
Record at 384.
Prior to and during the marriage, Mr. Rudman operated theater
businesses in five states with over twenty screens.

The business

was conducted through several entities including Westates, Cache
Amusement,

T.T.&S. Corporation,

and

other

business

entities.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 16. Record at
381-3.
During the marriage, Mrs. Rudman substantially assisted Mr.
Rudman in the operation of his theater business.

Mrs. Rudman

helped remodel, clean, vacuum, paint, run errands, make and hang

2102036.PL2
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drapes and purchase and prepare food.
a ticket taker.
During

Mrs. Rudman also worked as

Vol. V, p. 27-30.

the marriage, Mrs. Rudman

also

assisted

in the

construction and furnishing of a cabin at Scofield, Utah and other
properties owned by Mr. Rudman.

Mrs. Rudman used in excess of

$1,500.00 of her personal funds in furnishing the cabin.

Vol. V,

p. 60-62.
Mrs. Rudman suffers from back pain and numbness of her right
leg and hypersensitivity in the right foot as the result of being
thrown from a horse.

She also suffers from intermittent growths

in her thyroid and from stress. Vol. V, p. 1-5.
The parties had no children born as issue of their marriage.
Vol. I, p. 24. At the time of trial, Mrs. Rudman was 60 years of
age and Mr. Rudman was 63 years of age.
Conclusions of Law, paragraph 3.

Findings of Fact and

Record at 378.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
First, prior to her marriage to Mr. Rudman, Mrs. Rudman was
receiving $1,100.00 per month of permanent alimony and had in
excess

of

herself.

$195,000.00

in

income-producing

assets

to support

The trial court awarded Mrs. Rudman $1,100.00 per month

of alimony to her age 65 and approximately $32,000.00 of cash
assets. Given Mrs. Rudman's reasonable monthly needs of $2,853.00,

2102036.PL2
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the trial court's temporary alimony award of $1,100.00 constitutes
an abuse of discretion.
Second, the trial court erred in its characterization of
certain property as non-marital in nature.

The trial court also

erred in the value ascribed to certain marital property in light
of the evidence before it. Accordingly, the trial court abused its
discretion in its award of property to Mrs. Rudman.
Finally, Mrs. Rudman incurred attorney's and expert witness
fees in excess of $55,500.00. Each party was ordered to pay their
own fees and costs.

Mrs. Rudman does not have the financial

ability to pay her fees and costs. The failure of the trial court
to award any fees and costs is inequitable and constitutes an abuse
of discretion.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
THE AMOUNT AND DURATION OF ALIMONY AWARDED
The trial court found that prior to the marriage of the
parties, Mrs. Rudman was receiving $1,100.00 per month as permanent
alimony from a former spouse. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, paragraph 13. Record at 380. The trial court also found that
Mrs. Rudman

210203G.PL2
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was fearful of losing this alimony by
remarriage and expressed her concern to the
Plaintiff and the necessity that this marriage
be permanent.
The Court finds that the
Defendant lost this alimony by virtue of her
marriage to the Plaintiff and that it is
reasonable and just that temporary alimony be
paid to her until she reaches the age of Social
Security retirement, age 65. (Emphasis added) .
Id.

In its Conclusions of Law, the trial court stated that this

award of alimony
. . . is intended to return the Defendant to
the position she was in prior to the marriage
to the Plaintiff.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 4.
387.

Record at

The $1,100.00 per month award of alimony by the trial court

did restore Mrs. Rudman to the amount of alimony she was receiving
prior to the marriage of the parties but not to the duration of
that alimony.

In addition, Mrs. Rudman was, prior to the marriage

of the parties, supplementing her alimony with income from a
substantial base of income-producing assets. During the marriage,
this base of income-producing assets was dissipated because Mrs.
Rudman was forced to support herself without assistance from Mr.
Rudman.

Under the facts of this case, the trial court abused its

discretion by not making a permanent alimony award to Mrs. Rudman
for the amount of her reasonable needs.

2102036.PL2
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A.

The Amount Of Alimony.

In Munns v. Munns, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1990),
the Utah Court of Appeals has most recently reiterated the standard
for an award of alimony.
In setting an award of alimony, a trial court
must consider three factors: 1) the financial
condition and need of the receiving spouse; 2)
the ability of the receiving spouse to produce
a sufficient income for him or herself; and 3)
the ability of the responding spouse to provide
support. (Citations omitted.)
Id. at 90.

Nowhere in the trial court's Memorandum Decision or

its Findings of Fact is there any indication that it considered or
analyzed the circumstances of the parties in light of these three
factors.

The only finding and conclusion dealing with the issue

of alimony is that cited above.
A trial court's award of such support in a
divorce proceeding will not be set aside absent
a showing of abuse of discretion. However, the
trial court must make findings on all material
issues, and such findings must be sufficiently
detailed and consist of enough subsidiary facts
to reveal the steps the court took to reach its
conclusion on each factual issue presented.
Failure
to
substantiate
such
findings
constitutes reversible error unless the facts
in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and
capable of supporting only a finding in favor
of the judgment." (Citations omitted.)
Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.26 615, 617 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The trial

court

failed

to adequately make

findings and

conclusions sufficient for this court to determine whether the

210203G.PL2
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trial court properly analyzed the circumstances of the parties in
light of these three factors.

Notwithstanding that failure,

finding of fact no. 13 does allow the following implications to be
drawn:
1.

Mrs. Rudman does have financial needs.

Otherwise, no

alimony would have been awarded.
2.

Mrs. Rudman does not have the ability to totally satisfy

her own financial needs. Otherwise, Mr. Rudman would not have been
ordered to pay alimony.
3.

Mr. Rudman has the financial ability to provide for the

financial needs and support of Mrs. Rudman. Otherwise, Mr. Rudman
would not have been ordered to pay alimony.
Although these three additional findings are implicit in
finding of fact no. 13, there is no basis in fact or law for the
trial court to have awarded temporary alimony in the amount of
$1,100.00 per month.

This Court's analysis, by a review of the

record and the evidence, will compel it to conclude that the trial
court

abused

its discretion

in

fixing the alimony

award at

$1,100.00 per month.
First, Exhibit 102 evidences the monthly financial needs of
Mrs. Rudman in the amount of $2,853.00. Her need is modest given
the lifestyle the parties enjoyed during the marriage.

Mrs.

Rudman's testimony as to the reasonableness of these needs stands

2102036.PL2

13

unrebutted.

Vol. V, p. 59.

It is unknown upon what evidence the

trial court relied and baffling how it concluded that Mrs. Rudman
has financial needs of only $1,100.00 per month.
Second, Mrs. Rudman has shown limited ability to produce an
income

sufficient

to provide

for her own

needs.

She made

continuous efforts throughout the marriage to provide for the
parties' needs through self-employed business ventures but little,
if any, income was generated therefrom. Mrs. Rudman has not earned
more than $6,000.00 per year from any of her business ventures.
Exhibit 101.

Mrs. Rudman was forced to pursue these business

ventures due to Mr. Rudman's refusal to provide any assistance to
her in satisfying the financial needs of the parties during the
marriage. The result was the dissipation of practically all of her
pre-marital income-producing assets.
Finally, Mr. Rudman has the ability to provide the financial
support Mrs. Rudman requires.

Exhibit 118 evidences that Mr.

Rudman had cash income before taxes for the years 1982 through 1988
of at least $64,791 and as high as $141,876 per year.

Given Mr.

Rudman's income, he should not be allowed to withhold his financial
support after the marriage as he did during the marriage. This is
particularly true in light of the fact that the income-producing
assets of Mrs. Rudman have now been dissipated.
that Mr. Rudman support his former spouse.

210203G.PL2
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Equity requires

Accordingly, Mr. Rudman should be ordered to pay alimony in
the amount of $2,853.00 per month less any amount this court finds
that Mrs. Rudman may be able to generate from her employment.
B.

The Duration of Alimony

The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have held
on numerous occasions that temporary alimony is inappropriate for
women in circumstances comparable to those of Mrs. Rudman. Factors
which have been considered include: (1) age; (2) education; (3)
professional and vocational training and skills; (4) prior work
experience; (5) anticipated income from future employment; (6)
independent

income;

(7) health;

and

(8) the

length

of

the

marriage.6
In this case, Mrs. Rudman was 60 years old at the time of
trial. The divorce occurred after an eight year marriage and five
years of steady dating prior thereto.
back and other health problems.

Mrs. Rudman suffers from

She has no education beyond high

school and no professional or vocational training or skills.
Although she has been self-employed in the past, her most recent
attempts have produced only nominal income and such levels of
income can only be anticipated in the future.

6

Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985); Paffel v. Paffel,
732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986); Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).
210203G.PL2
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Mrs. Rudman had income-producing assets valued in excess of
$195,000.00 prior to the marriage but was only awarded $32,000.00
of cash by the trial court.

She used substantially all of her

income-producing assets to support herself and Mr. Rudman during
the marriage either directly or indirectly by her attempts to earn
income through business ventures.

In addition to the $32,000.00,

Mrs. Rudman was

in Logan with an equity of

awarded

a home

$67,500.00, as found by the trial court, and the Merry Maid
business.

Mr. Rudman, on the other hand, has income-producing

assets valued in excess of $4,000,000.00 according to his only
financial statements (Exhibit 78) and has consistently earned in
excess of $100,000.00 per year.

Exhibit 118.

The trial court attempts to establish in its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law that it is restoring Mrs. Rudman to the
position she enjoyed prior to the marriage.
Mrs. Rudman must receive permanent

To do so, however,

alimony in the amount of

$1,100.00 per month and $190,000.00 of income-producing assets.
The trial court's award of temporary alimony in conjunction with
its meager property award to Mrs. Rudman falls far short of its
stated goal.
Mrs. Rudman is unable to provide for all of her financial
needs.

Exhibits 101 and 102.

It is unrealistic to assume that

Mrs. Rudman will be able to provide for herself beyond age 65. It

210203G.PL2
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is equitable that Mrs. Rudman be awarded permanent alimony in the
amount of $2,853.00 per month to terminate on the occurrence of
events provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5) (1989).

The

award of temporary alimony in the amount of $1,100.00 per month
constitutes an abuse of the trial court's discretion and should,
therefore, be reversed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS
CHARACTERIZATION AND DETERMINATION OF
THE VALUE OF CERTAIN MARITAL PROPERTY
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (1989) tersely provides:
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court
may include in it equitable orders relating to
the children, property, and parties. . .
The term "property" is not defined in the Code.

In structuring a

property division, the trial court should attempt to
. . . allocate the property in a manner which
best serves the needs of the parties and best
permits them to pursue their separate lives.
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987).
In this case, the trial court erred in (1) its characterization of certain property as separate or non-marital in nature
and (2) its determination of the value of certain items of marital
property.

2102036.PL2
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A.

The Characterization Of Property

The trial court found that the parties voluntarily entered
into a prenuptial agreement and that it was unambiguous and could
be interpreted as a matter of law. The trial court also found that
each party relinquished all rights to any property accumulated by
the other party prior to the marriage but that any property
accumulated

by

the

parties

"either

individually

following the marriage would be marital property.

or

jointly"

The trial court

further found any premarital property would remain the property of
the party owning it prior to the marriage including any interest
or increase in the value of that property after the marriage.
Property acquired after the marriage would be considered marital
property "less that amount utilized for its acquisition where that
amount could be traced as premarital property."

(Emphasis added).

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraphs 6-10.
at 378-80.

Record

See, also Exhibit E.

The trial court found ten items of real and personal property
to constitute marital property.
of Law, paragraphs 19 and 20.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions
Record at 383-4.

The trial court,

however, improperly excluded as marital property, other assets
acquired during the marriage.
The first category of marital property improperly excluded by
the trial court was loans Mr. and Mrs. Rudman made during the

210203G.PL2
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marriage to various business entities which operate Mr. Rudman's
theaters.

Mrs. Rudman's expert witness, Merrill R. Norman, CPA

testified that the total net increase in the amount of such loans
during the marriage was $269,704.00.
and Exhibit 117.

Vol. V, p. 166-8 and 191-6

That amount represents the net increase during

the marriage in the amount of funds payable by Mr. Rudman's
business entities to the Rudmans individually.
Due to the lack of information and documents produced by Mr.
Rudman, Mr. Norman was unable to specifically identify or trace the
source of the loaned funds.

When questioned by Mr. Rudman's

counsel, Mr. Norman testified:
Q.

Can you tell me if they [the loans receivable]
were assets in existence prior to the marriage
or after the marriage that those funds came
from?

A.

The information traceable is not available.

Q.

It could be either not available or your people
didn't find it or look for it; is that
accurate?

A.

No, it could be as Mr. Rudman expressed that
he didn't know who it was owed to, or when it
started and I think the same would be true of
me. I can tie it down to an asset that is
created during the marriage because it doesn't
exist before the marriage. But I can't fill
in all the missing blanks for you. I don't
believe you can either.

Vol. V, p. 192-3.

Mr. Rudman presented no evidence as to the

source of the loaned funds.
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The issue then becomes whether the source of the money loaned
by the Rudmans to the business entities constituted non-marital or
marital property.

If non-marital, the source of the funds must be

traced to pre-marital assets or earnings from pre-marital assets.
Otherwise, pursuant to the prenuptial agreement, the source of the
funds must be considered marital in nature.
The Utah Court of Appeals has stated:
As a general rule, pre-marital property, gifts,
and inheritances may be viewed as the separate
property of the parties. Burke v. Burke. 733
P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987).
Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
However,
[t]he rule that property acquired by gift or
inheritance by one spouse should be awarded to
that spouse on divorce unless the other spouse
has, by his or her efforts with regard to the
property, acquired an equity in it does not
apply when the property thus acquired is
consumed, such as . . . when the property
completely loses its identity and is not
traceable because it is commingled with other
property (sometimes called transmuted), Wierman
v. Wierman, supra: Klinabera v. Klingbera.
supra. Agent v. Agent, 604 P.2d 862 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1979). . . (Emphasis added.)
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307 (Utah 1988).
Thus, as Mr. Norman testified, during the course of the
marriage, there was a $269,704.00 increase in loans receivable held
by the Rudmans payable from the various business entities.

No

evidence was presented to allow the trial court to trace the source
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of the loaned

funds.

Accordingly, the $269,704.00

in loans

receivable held by the Rudmans at the termination of the marriage
should be characterized as marital property.
The second category of marital property improperly excluded
by the

trial court was

(1) improvements

to the Bloomington

condominium, (2) improvements to and furnishing of the Scofield
cabin and (3) improvements to and furnishing of the Elizabeth
Street

condominium.

Mrs.

Rudman

presented

testimony

that

approximately $1,300.00, $17,000.00 and $8,598.00, respectively,
of improvements and furnishings were expended in conjunction with
these assets.

Exhibit 117.

Mrs. Rudman testified that the majority of the furniture she
brought

into the marriage was used

condominium and the Scofield cabin.

in the Elizabeth

Street

Vol. V, p. 23-25.

Her

furniture from the Scofield cabin has not been returned. Id. The
Scofield cabin was improved and furnished during the marriage.
Vol. V, p. 60-1.

The best evidence as to the amount of the

improvements to the Scofield cabin is the testimony of the Rudman's
insurance agent who testified that the insurance coverage was
increased by Mr. Rudman from 1981 to 1982 in the amount of
$17,000.00.

Vol II, p. 163-4.

Accordingly, the trial court should have characterized the
improvement to and furnishing of the above-described properties as
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marital property and included in the marital estate the amount of
$26,898.00.
B.

The Value Of Excluded Marital Assets

The trial court erred in its determination of the values found
for certain of the marital assets.
1.

Loans Receivable.

As previously

stated, the loans

receivable by the Rudmans from the various business entities in the
amount of $269,704.00 should be included in the marital estate.
2.

Improvement

and Furnishing Expenses.

As previously

stated, improvement costs and furnishing expenses in the amount of
$26,898.00, should be included in the marital estate.
3.

Cinemas I, II & III in St. George. The trial court found

that the value of the Rudman's one-half interest in the property
commonly referred to as Cinemas I, II, & III in St. George was
$19,000. These three theaters were operated in the Westates entity.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 20.a.

Record

at 384.
Mr. Rudman's expert witness, Stephen Nicolatus, testified that
these cinemas had a total value of $76,000.00 using an income
approach to value and a $0.00 value using the asset approach to
value.

Exhibit 59, p. 19 and 21, respectively.

Mr. Nicolatus

used

a 25 percent

Vol IV, p. 6-37.

capitalization

rate

in his

computation of the income approach. Mr. Nicolatus also charged 42
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percent of the compensation paid for management of all 24 of the
theaters in Westates to the three theaters which were being valued.
Mr. Norman testified, without rebuttal, that use of the
capitalization rate of 25 percent was too high based on independent
industry-wide statistics. Vol. V, p. 140-1. Mr. Norman testified
that a capitalization rate of 18 percent should be used.

In

reviewing theater industry statistics for six years, Mr. Norman
concluded that the return on equity never exceeded 18 percent and
that a rate of approximately 10 percent was more realistic.
Mr. Norman also testified that the management compensation
assigned

to these three

theaters was excessive

and that an

adjustment to the calculated net income was necessary. Mr. Norman
allowed 25 percent of the management compensation to be charged to
these three theaters.

Although the trial court is vested with

broad discretion to interpret the evidence, common sense requires
the

conclusion

that

Mr.

Nicolatus'

management

allocation and capitalization rate were improper.

compensation
Applying these

two changes in the income approach to value, Mr. Norman calculated
the value of the cinemas to be $172,072.00.

Exhibit 117.

The trial court found Mr. Rudman's one-half interest in these
cinemas to be $19,000.00.
Record at 384.

Findings of Fact, paragraph 20.a.

Although the Findings of Fact are not clear, the

trial court apparently averaged Mr. Nicolatus' income approach to
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value ($38,000.00 for Mr. Rudman's one-half interest) and his asset
approach to value ($0.00 for Mr. Rudman's one-half interest) to
determine a value of $19,000.00.

Id. However, even Mr. Nicolatus

did not average the approaches.

This court should adopt the

methodology and assumptions employed by Mr. Norman and increase the
value of the marital estate by $67,000, representing the difference
between Mr. Norman's appraisal of $86,000 and the trial court's
determination of $19,000 for Mr. Rudman's one-half interest in the
three theaters.
4.

The Jeep Wagoneer.

Mr. Rudman presented no evidence to

support his claim that the value of his 1988 Jeep Wagoneer was
$12,000.00 as of the date of the trial, as illustrated in Exhibit
40. Mr. Norman used a NADA blue book to determine the value of the
Jeep at $17,813.00 as of April, 1989.

Exhibit 177, note N.

Although an owner of property can testify as to its value, the
trial court adopted Mr. Rudman's assertion as to value while
totally ignoring the NADA blue book, the best and most credible
evidence.
Accordingly,

the value of the marital

estate

should be

increased by $5,813.00 representing the difference in the two
values ascribed to the Jeep.
5.

Cinemas II and III— Cache Amusement in Logan, Utah. The

trial court found that Cinemas II and III of Cache Amusement
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located

in Logan, Utah, had

$5,348.00.
20.d.

a marital

value

of

a negative

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph

Record at 384.

The trial court adopted Mr. Rudman's

analysis and computation of value as presented in Exhibit 40. Mr.
Rudman's analysis of value consisted of three elements:

(1) the

appraised value of the real property in the amount of $415,000.00
(Exhibit 31), plus (2) the equipment value of $1,243.00, less (3)
the cost of construction in the amount of $426,939.00, equaling a
total value of a negative of $10,696.00. Mr. Rudman's 50 percent
ownership in the two theaters is, therefore, valued at a negative
$5,340.00.
Mr. Norman employed the same methodology as Mr. Rudman to
value the theaters except in two respects.

First, Mr. Norman

included the equipment at a value that is more representative of
its market value.

Mr. Rudman used a value of $1,243.00 based on

an "aggressive" depreciation method for tax purposes.
144-7 and Exhibit 116.

Vol. V, p.

Mr. Rudman's approach assumed that the

equipment depreciated from its cost of $106,096.00 as to January,
1985, to a value of $1,243.00 as of April, 1989.

Such an

assumption and approach does not reflect the true value of the
equipment as of the date of valuation.
Second, Mr. Norman subtracted the debt of Cache Amusement
associated with the construction costs in the amount of $339,459.00
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rather than the actual cost of construction in the amount of
$426,939.00, as Mr. Rudman did.

Exhibit 116.

This difference in

methodology again raises the issue of whether the source of the
money used to pay down the debt constitutes non-marital or marital
property.
to

If non-marital, the source of the funds must be traced

pre-marital

Otherwise,

assets

pursuant

to

or
the

constitute marital property.

earnings

on

prenuptial

pre-marital
agreement,

assets.

the

funds

In Schedule B5 of Exhibit 42, Mr.

Rudman attempts to establish that all funds for the construction
of the cinemas came from pre-marital assets or earnings thereon.
Due to the substantial commingling that is present, tracing the
funds is impossible.

The source of the funds must, therefore, be

considered marital property.
The

value

of

the marital

estate

should,

therefore, be

increased by $103,174.00 representing the difference between the
value of $97,826.00 as determined by Mr. Norman and $<5,348.00> as
determined by Mr. Rudman for the Logan cinemas.
In summary, the value of the marital estate should, therefore,
be increased as follows:
Loans Receivable
Improvement/Furnishings
St. George Cinemas
Jeep Wagoneer
Logan Cinemas
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$269,704
$ 26,898
$ 67,000
$ 5,813
$103,174
$472,589

As a test of reasonableness as to the amount the marital
estate increased in value during the marriage, this Court need only
review

Exhibits

73-78.

Those

Exhibits,

personal

financial

statements prepared by Mr. Rudman, demonstrate an increase in value
in excess of $2 million during the marriage.

The trial court's

determination that the marital estate consisted of property valued
at $63,134.00 and that Mrs. Rudman should receive a cash award of
one-half of that amount constitutes a clear abuse of the trial
court's discretion under the facts of this case.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BT FAILING TO AWARD MRS. RUDMAN HER
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPERT WITNESS FEES
In this case, the trial court expressed concern about the
amount of attorney's fees and expert witness fees incurred by the
parties.

Mrs. Rudman's

attorney's

fees were

in excess of

$38,000.00, voluntarily reduced to $28,000.00 by her trial counsel,
and

expert witness

fees

exceeded

$27,500.00.

Mr. Rudman's

attorney's fees exceeded $15,800.00 and his expert witness fees
were "somewhat less than that."

Findings of Fact and Conclusion

of Law, paragraph 24. Record at 386. The trial court ordered each
party to assume and pay their own attorney's and expert witness
fees.
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the attorney for each party presented evidence to demonstrate the
reasonableness of their respective fees, the trial court found "no
need . . . to rule upon the reasonableness of the fees and costs
in this matter."
paragraph 25.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law,

Record at 386.

To recover attorney fees and costs in a divorce action,
the moving party must show evidence (1)
establishing the financial need of the
requesting party, and (2) demonstrating the
reasonableness of the amount of the award.
(Citations omitted).
Munns v. Munns, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 88, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
In this case, Mrs. Rudman incurred attorney's and expert
witness fees of $55,500.00.

Mrs. Rudman had $6,000.00 of cash at

the time of trial and was awarded an additional $26,305.50 under
the Decree of Divorce to equalize the division of the marital
estate.

Decree of Divorce, paragraphs 4 and 5.

Record at 394-5.

Accordingly, Mrs. Rudman was awarded $32,305.50 of liquid assets
which will not even begin to approach the amount necessary to pay
her fees and costs.

Mrs. Rudman's financial need is, therefore,

clearly established.

In fact, an attempt by Mrs. Rudman to pay the

fees will place her in financial jeopardy.
The evidence also clearly establishes that Mr. Rudman has the
ability to pay for Mrs. Rudman's fees.
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Mr. Rudman was awarded

assets with a value in excess of $4 million, which assets generate
substantial cash flow to him.
The record reflects that counsel for Mrs. Rudman had to take
extraordinary measures including numerous motions and hearings to
pursue discovery and force Mr. Rudman to pay ordered support. Vol.
V, p. 214-121 and Exhibit 120. The trial court's failure to award
attorney's fees to Mrs. Rudman is particularly inequitable given
the extraordinary measures her counsel was forced to take during
the pendency of this action.
The trial court's failure to award Mrs. Rudman her attorney's
and expert witness fees is inequitable and constitutes an abuse of
discretion.

Similarly, the trial court's failure to rule on the

reasonableness

of

the

fees

constitutes

reversible

error.

Accordingly, the decision of the trial court should be reversed and
the case remanded for determination of a reasonable award to Mrs.
Rudman for her attorney's and expert witness fees.
CONCLUSION
The trial court failed to properly consider the evidence and
the law in awarding $1,100.00 of temporary alimony.

The trial

court erred in its characterization of certain property as nonmarital and in its determination of value ascribed to certain
marital property.

The trial court further erred by failing to

properly consider the evidence and the law and concluding that an
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award of attorney's and expert witness fees to Mrs. Rudman was not
appropriate.
Therefore, this court should:
1.

Reverse the trial court's award of alimony and award

permanent alimony in the amount of $2,853.00.
2. Reverse the trial court's award of property and award Mrs.
Rudman

an

additional

amount

of

$236,295.00

to

equalize

the

distribution of the marital estate.
3. Reverse the trial court's failure to award attorney's and
expert witness fees and award Mrs. Rudman the amount of $55,500.00
for her fees.
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of May, 1990.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

Clark W. Sessions
Dean C. Andreasen
Attorneys for Evelyn W. Rudman
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EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT A

DETERMINAT i V"E AUTHORITY
1.

Utah Code Ann- § "iO-»J-5|I) (1989),
(] ) When a decree of divorce Is rendered, the
court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, and
parties.

EXHIBIT B

Thuoju.^uL:^ict
EXHIBIT B

APR 2 8 1989

IN THE DISTRICT COURT •*? THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN

AMI i WU

SnLJ 1

- .- :

J..-.

,

Li 1A1 b OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ANTHONY W. RUDMAN,

CIVIL NO. D-87-1691

Plaintiff,
vs.
EVELYN W

RUDMAN,

Defendant.

days D £ trial.
Memoranda.

The parties submitted closing arguments by way of

The Court has now reviewed the evidence, the argument

of counsel , and makes the following decisi on.
This Memorandum Decision is not a substitute for Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law. The prevai] i ng pan t;y wi ] 1 prepare
Findings
include

and Conclusions
all facts

consistent

deemed

necessary

with

this

to

support

decision, and
the Court's

decision.
This
Plaintiff,

was

a

Anthony

marriage
Rudman,

of

relatively

short

duration.

age 63, and defendant,

Evelyn w.

Rudman. age 60, M ex: e marrj ed < n Api i 1 I ', l'*fl I „ Mini '-;eparated si x
y e a r s later o n Apri 1 2 6 , 2 98 7.
Both parties had substantial assets prior to the marriage.
Mr s

R u d in a :i" i ]" e t a 1 n e d a rl a t f „ u r n e ) " 1: t > p r e pa r e a p r e n u p t i a 1
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Both parties stipulated that the said agreement was

into voluntarily, and without duress or fraud.

Both

parties assert that the said agreement is clear and unambiguous,
and that the Court may interpret the same as a matter of law.
The Court ruled that pursuant to the said agreement each party
relinquished any and all rights to any property accumulated by
the other party prior to the marriage, that

such premarital

property would not be deemed to be a marital asset of the parties
following the marriage, and that any property accumulated by the
parties "either individually or jointly" following the marriage
would be marital property.

The Court further ruled that any

premarital property remain the property of the individual party,
and that this would include any interest or increase in the value
of that property after the marriage.

The Court further ruled

that that property acquired after the marriage would be marital
property "less that amount" utilized for its acquisition where
that amount could be traced to premarital property.
Generally, property brought into the marriage by one spouse,
or property acquired by gift and inheritance during the marriage
by one spouse, or property acquired in exchange thereof, should
go to that spouse unless the other spouse by his or her efforts
or expense contributed substantially to the enhancement of that
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p r o p e r t y t h e r e i in rinqui ri tiq a n e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t

in 1.1" , or , w h e r e

the property has lost its identity through commingling, or where
the said spouse has made a gift of an interest in the property to
the othei

spouse,

Mortenson v. Mortenson,

760 F 2d 304

(Utah

1988).
In the case at bar
forth

the

proper t/y

however, the premarital agreement sets

ri ght s

:)f the

pa r t i e s

ai id,

therefore,

identifies as marital property that property accumulated during
the marriage with either personal or marital funds, less that
amoui it each spouse expended
Both

parties

accountants) .

called

More

> acquire the said property.
expert

often

witnesses

than, not

(certified

exper t

public

xi tnesses

testimony substantially different from each other,

:j:ii ve

A national

financial publication recently submitted

a tax question to 50

CPA1 s

received

results

acr o s s

I: "he

-

lini ted

differences

Experts can differ

•in i

States
In

some

instances

theory and application.
. -

i different
exceeding

60%.

The same experts

.

*

:. : -• ent

common experience ; ^ - +> "rial courts.

conclusions

The case at bar is no exception.
eterminar
the intricacies
can

theory

*r **

do 1 a: which

, ?:^

'
*

*•

,rt- wi"n no+" turn on

application where nearly anything
*
. equitable.

> -

of thi s Court to

' - *ilL look to the
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along with all other evidence and make its

decision unto that end.
Based upon the evidence, the Court finds as follows:
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter.
The plaintiff is entitled to and is granted divorce from the
defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
The defendant is entitled to and granted a divorce from the
plaintiff on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
At the time of the marriage, Mrs. Rudman was receiving
$1,100.00 per month alimony from a prior marriage.

She was

fearful of losing this alimony by remarriage and expressed her
concerns to Mr. Rudman and the necessity of this remarriage being
permanent.
Mr. Rudman.
awarded

She lost this alimony by virtue of her marriage to
It is reasonable and just that Mrs. Rudman be

temporary

alimony

of

$1,100.00 per month, until

she

reaches the age of social security retirement, age 65.
The parties both contributed to living expenses during the
marriage, with Mrs. Rudman paying for food and miscellaneous
household expenses from her own funds and Mr. Rudman paying for
the housing, taxes and certain household expenses from his funds.
These parties seemed content to share in such expenses from their
own funds and while it would appear Mr. Rudman paid a greater
share of such expenses, there is no real evidence to determine
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finds I (hit neillit'i pari1,1 qained an id vint (a^p

t ho court

over the other In this regard.
Mr

Rudman had considerable properties at the ti me of his

man: iage I o Mrs

h'uclmari ,

"iriit?i:e has been no commingli ng of Mr.

Rudman 1 s assets with those of Mrs, Rudman
have maintained

their

separate

identity,

beei 1 expai isi 0:1: 1, :i : emode] :i i l g
premarital

property.

Mr. Rudman 1 s assets

:::: i:

even where there

Mrs. Rudman did not contribute
I*

labor

reasonable

or
and

Ri ldmai 1 have and mai nta in h is premarital proper ties,

including the improvements and increase in values thereof.
property

to 1 i i s

improvemer 1 t in i: egar ds

assets towards any of these properties.
just that Mr

has

includes

the

condominium

on

El Izabeth

Such

Street,

the

Scofield property, the theatre properties existincr »+• +-he time of
the marriage, Westates Partnership,

and includes proceeds

from

, except where si ich pi: oceeds may ha^ire been

the
used

accumulate

new property

which case the

prenuptial

agreement would apply to the equitable interest thereof.
Mrs

RiidittiiiNi

marriage

and

businesses,
comm

from

and

;

And, Mr

I i. 111 i ' o n s i d e n a b i e
her

bought

assets

r - .el s

established
•- ' :?•

.*•

nt

assetb

.

"lie

tin i

two

There

uf

the

different

has been

those of Mr

no

Rudman.

Rudman did not contribute labor or assets towards any of

these properties.

However, they were newly acquired during the
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marriage and the equity therein is governed by the premarital
agreement.
This Court finds that the only newly acquired property to be
considered marital property of this marriage are the St. George
leasehold, the added screens to the Logan cinemas, the Davis
land, the St. George lot, the Sumac Drive property in Logan, the
Merry Maids business, the Diet Center which was sold during the
marriage, and miscellaneous personal property.
The Court finds that the marital property has the following
values:
1.

Plaintiff fs

one-half

interest

in

the

St.

George

leasehold has a value of $19,000.00.
2.

The

St.

George

lot

has

an

equitable

value

of

$22,250.00.
3.

The Davis land has a value of $28,650.00, of which the

plaintiff's one-half interest is $14,325.00.
4.

The

$416,243.00.

Logan

cinemas

additions

have

a

value

of

The cost of construction was $426,939.00, leaving a

negative balance of $10,696.00.

Mr. Rudman1s one-half interest

in this negative balance is -$5,348.00.
5.

The property on Sumac Drive in Logan has a value of

$107,500.00.

Mrs. Rudman made a down payment of $32,500.00, took

a mortgage of $40,000.00, and spent $42,000.00 to remodel.
is a negative balance of $7,000.00.

There

RUDMAN ' -

6.

RUDMAN

The

$38,000.00,

0i e t

and
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Cent s 7" was

sold

for

pnirchased

$50,000.00

during

considerable amount was spent by defendant
tins i ness .

m

by

defendant

the

marriage.

for
A

improving the said

The i"Vm i i< f inds $;', 000 , 0 0 eqi *

< --

ealized from the

sale . r tr.e center.
The Court finds that Merry Maids has an equitable value

*~ v-iV;r if 1,500 shares of Technolab, Inc. is unknown
to t ~e Court,

^v.w each party should be entitled to one-half of

the
The Jeep Wagoneer is marital property and has an equity
of $

;.

i: it I a 3

1? Inane i a 1

shares

have

a

va l u e

$587 :;

The Court makes the following award:
The Court awards to Mr. Rudman the following property:
PROPERTY

VALUE

St. George cinema interest

$19,000,00

Logan cinema interest

- 5,343.00
22,250,0 3

Jeep Wagoneer

1,471,61

Davis property

14f 3 25.00
TOTAL

$51,698.61

of
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Mrs. Rudman is awarded the following:

PROPERTY

VALUE

Logan home

-$7,000.00

Diet Center sale proceeds

2,000.00

Merry Maids

3,500.00

Prudential Financial shares
TOTAL

587.50
-$

912.50

Inasmuch as Mr. Rudman is awarded most of the property, with
a value of $51,698.61 and Mrs. Rudman's property comes to a minus
value of -$912.50, a cash settlement of $26,305.50 must be made
to equalize the award.

Mrs. Rudman is awarded that sum.

In addition to the above, furniture and furnishings were
purchased during the marriage.

Mrs. Rudman has considerable

amount of the said furniture in her possession.

Mr. Rudman

purchased replacement furniture during the period of separation.
All is marital property.
keep

that

personal

The Court finds that each party should

property

presently

in

his

or

her

own

possession, and that they are approximately equal in value.
In regards to attorney's

fees and costs, each party is

ordered to pay his and her own.

While the Court awarded Mrs.

Rudman alimony until she reaches the age of 65, it did so only
because it found that she gave up alimony in marrying Mr. Rudman,
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However, this was a marriage
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was
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presently self-employed in a third business.

She lives in Sal t

Lake City, but has purchased a second home in Logan, Utah which
she v isits pen iodical ly whenever she can

She is a very pleasant

and dignified appearing woman, and based upon her history there
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means to provide for reasonable attorney's fees and costs,
The

Court

is

very
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about

the

fees

arid

costs

excess of $3 8,000,o0 {voluntarily decreased to $2 8,000.00), and
the

fee
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Mr

expert witness, CPA Merrill

Norman,

exceeds
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his expert witness is somewhat less than that.
Since the Court has ordered each party to pay its own fees
iii'il cost s,

til ler e

::i s i 10 need

for

reasonableness of the fees and costs..

th is Court

to
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attorney will prepare
Law,

and

Decree,

and

the Findings of Fact,
submit

the

same

to

defendant's attorney for approval as to form before submitting to
the Court for final si«
Dated this

/--7Vr" ""Viay of April, 1989.

IARD H. RUSS01
STRICT COURT JUDGE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ANTHONY W. RUDMAN,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.
EVELYN W. RUDMAN,

Civil No. D87-1691

Defendant.

Judge Leonard H. Russon
ooOoo

This matter having come on regularly for trial on April 4,
5, 11, and 12, 1989 before the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, one
of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff, ANTHONY W.
RUDMAN, appearing in person and by and through his attorney, Paul
H. Liapis, and Defendant, EVELYN W. RUDMAN, appearing in person
and by and through her attorney, David S. Dolowitz, and the
parties and expert witnesses having been duly sworn and examined
under oath, and documentary evidence having been marked and
received by the Court, and more than three months having elapsed
since the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint and Defendant's Counterclaim herein, and the Court having requested and received written

argument from each party and having inquired into the legal
sufficiency of the evidence so adduced, and being fully advised
in the premises, and the Court having issued its Memorandum
Decision on the 28th day of April, 1989, the Court does now make,
adopt, and find the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant were bona fide and actual

residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for more than three
months immediately prior to the filing of the Complaint herein,
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife,

having been married on April 17, 1981, in Sun Valley, State of
Idaho, and were separated six years later on April 26, 1987• The
Court finds this was a marriage of relatively short duration.
3.

The Court finds that Plaintiff, Anthony W. Rudman, is

age 63, and Defendant, Evelyn W. Rudman, is age 60.
4.

No children have been born as issue of this marriage,

and none are expected.
5.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff and Defendant are

each entitled to a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable
differences.
6.

The Court finds that both parties had substantial

assets prior to the marriage and that Defendant had retained an
attorney to prepare a prenuptial agreement, which was signed by
the parties prior to their marriage.
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7.

The Court finds that both parties stipulated that said

agreement was entered into voluntarily, and without duress or
fraud, that the agreement was clear and unambiguous and that the
Court could interpret the same as a matter of law.
8.

The Court has previously ruled that pursuant to the

prenuptial agreement, each party relinquished any and all rights
to any property accumulated by the other party prior to the
marriage, that such premarital property would not be deemed a
marital asset of the parties following the marriage, and that any
property accumulated by the parties "either individually or
jointly" following the marriage would be marital property.

The

Court further ruled that said agreement provided that any
premarital property would remain the property of the individual party
owning it prior to the marriage and that this would include any
interest or increase in the value of that property after the
marriage.
9.

The Court further ruled that said agreement provided

that property acquired after the marriage would be marital
property "less that amount utilized for its acquisition where
that amount could be traced as premarital property".
10.

The Court finds in this particular case that the

premarital agreement clearly set forth the property rights
accumulated by the parties during the marriage to be that
property accumulated during the marriage with either personal or

3

marital funds less those amounts that each spouse expended to
acquire said property.

Further, the Court finds that all other

property not falling into this definition is premarital and
should be returned to the party owning that property prior to
this marriage.
11.

The Court finds that both parties called expert

witnesses to testify as to values and income in this matter.
12.

It is the purpose of this Court to do that which is

fair, just, and equitable, and the Court will look to the expert
testimony, along with all other evidence, in making its findings
in this matter.
13.

The Court finds that prior to this marriage, the

Defendant was receiving $1,100.00 per month as alimony from a
prior marriage.

The Court finds that Plaintiff was fearful of

losing this alimony by remarriage and expressed her concern to
the Plaintiff and the necessity that this marriage be permanent.
The Court finds that the Defendant lost this alimony by virtue of
her marriage to the Plaintiff and that it is reasonable and just
that temporary alimony be paid to her until she reaches the age
of Social Security retirement, age 65.
14.

The Court finds that both parties contributed to living

expenses during the marriage, with Defendant paying for food and
miscellaneous household expenses from her funds, and Plaintiff
paying for the housing, taxes, and certain household expenses
from his funds.

The Court finds that both parties seemed content
4

to share these expenses from their own funds, that it appeared
Plaintiff paid a greater share of said expenses, but that the
evidence was inconclusive, and the Court finds that neither party
gained an advantage over the other in this regard.
15.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff owned considerable

properties at the time of the marriage to Defendant and that
there was no co-mingling of Mr. Rudman's assets of those of the
Defendant.

Plaintiff's assets were maintained as a separate

entity, including those where expansion, remodeling, or
improvements had been made to that premarital property.

The

Court finds that Defendant did not contribute labor or assets
toward any of these properties and that it is reasonable and just
that the Plaintiff have and maintain his properties, including
improvements and increases in values thereof.
16.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff premarital properties

are as follows:
a.

Condominium at 2560 Elizabeth Street, Salt Lake

City, Utah, acquired May 2, 1980.
b.

Trailer park and 14 acres of land in Scofield,

Utah, acquired by inheritance on April 14, 1976.
c.

10.4 acres of land in Scofield, Utah, upon which

the cabin is situated, acquired by inheritance April, 1976.
d.

The Douglas Street triplex and Bonus Office

Building sale contract, which properties were initially acquired
in 1974 and sold in 1979.
5

e.

Plaintiff's one-half interest in the Westates

partnership, commenced approximately 30 years ago, which includes
rentals of movie screens and/or theaters in Soda Springs, Mt.
Home, Rupert, Preston, Burley, Caldwell and Pocatello, Idaho;
Elko and Ely, Nevada; movie screens in Davis- (Layton), known as
CinemaCorp, acquired in 1970, Logan, known as Cache Amusement,
Inc., including the Redwood, Capital and Cinema I theaters;
Monticello, Mt. Pleasant, Roosevelt, Ephraim, 6 screens in St.
George, including the Cinema's I, II and III; the Gaiety, the
Dixie, and the Starlight; Jackson and Lyman, Wyoming, and West
Yellowstone, Montana.
f.

The Plaintiff's one-half interest in the St.

George condominium acquired with James Nicolodemus on November
13, 1972.
g.

Plaintiff's 80% ownership in T.T.& S. Corporation,

organized in 1980, which included the assets that came from the
Rock Theater Company, including, Montpelier, Evanston, and
Rawlins Theater screens, the latter of which was sold in 1982.
h.

Plaintiff's interest in the Trolley Theaters,

Trolley North, Trolley Corners, and Trolco, acquired in the mid1960' s, and the sale proceeds from Plaintiff's Trolley Square
interests negotiated in 1984, and paid in full in January, 1988.
i.

Plaintiff's ownership in a 1975 Dodge truck and

camper, a Jeep Wagoneer, a 1974 Ford horse truck, his jewelry,
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bank accounts, two horses, one a 17 year old mare and the second
its foal.
j.

Plaintiff's premarital bank accounts, including,

but not limited to, those associated with all of the business
entities referred to above.
17.

The Court finds that the Defendant had considerable

assets at the time of the marriage and from her assets established
two different businesses and bought a home in Logan.

The Court

finds there has been no co-mingling of the Defendant's assets
with those of the Plaintiff and that the Plaintiff did not
contribute labor or assets toward any of these properties.
18.

The Court finds that from the Plaintiff's and

Defendant's premarital assets there were newly acquired assets
during the marriage and that the equities therein are governed by
the terms of the premarital agreement.
19.

The Court finds that the newly acquired property to be

considered as marital property in this marriage are the lease
interest in the St. George movie screens Cinema I, II, and III,
the added screens to the Logan Cinemas designated as Cinema II
and III, the triangle piece of land added to the Davis Drive-in's;
the St. George Bloomington lot #17; the Defendant's home at 1515
Sumac Dr., Logan, Utah; the Defendant's Merry Maid business; the
proceeds Defendant received from the sale of her Diet Center
business and miscellaneous property.
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20.

The Court finds that the marital property has the

following values and/or encumbrances:
a.

Plaintiff's one-half
leasehold interest in St.
George Cinemas I, II and III

$

19,000.00

b.

St. George Bloomington Lot #17

$

22,250.00

c.

Plaintiff's one-half interest
in the triangle land for the
Davis Drive-in

$

14,325.00

Cinemas II and III (additions
to existing Cinema I) valued at
$416,243.00 with construction costs of
$426,939.00 leaving a negative balance of
-$10,696.00. Plaintiff has a onehalf interest therein
$

-5,348.00

1515 Sumac Dr., Logan, Utah$107,500.00, Defendant's down
payment of $32,500.00, mortgage
$40,000.00, remodeling costs$42,000.00-leaving a negative
balance

$

-7,000.00

Defendant's Diet Center, initial
purchase-$38,000.00 and sold for
$50,000.00, Defendant's investment
of considerable amounts therein, with
a net value of

$

2,000.00

Defendant's Merry Maid business with
equitable value

$

3,500.00

1500 shares Techno-Lab stock,
value unknown

$

0.00

Plaintiff's Jeep Wagoneer, value
$12,000.00, less lien of $10,528.39

$

1,471.61

50 shares of Prudential Financial
Service stock
TOTAL

$
$

587.50
63,134.11

d.

e.

f.

g.
h.
i.
j.

8

21.

The Court finds that to equalize a division of the

marital assets referred to above, that Plaintiff should pay a
cash settlement to Defendant.
22.

The Court finds that during the marriage, furniture and

furnishings were purchased and that the Defendant has a considerable amount of said items in her possession.

The Court finds

that the Plaintiff has purchased replacement furniture during the
period of separation, which constitutes marital property. The
Court finds that each party should keep those items of property
presently in their possession and determines the same to be of
approximately equal value.
23.

The Court finds that the Defendant was employed as an

insurance agent and subsequently was self-employed in owning an
answering service, which she sold in 1976 for $80,000.00. The
Court finds that during her first marriage, she was employed, and
that during this marriage, she has operated two separate
businesses and is presently self-employed in the third.

The

Court find that the Defendant resides in Salt Lake City, but has
purchased a second home in Logan, which she visits periodically.
The Court finds Defendant is a very pleasant and dignifiedappearing woman, and based upon her history, there is no reason
why she should not continue to work.

The Court finds she has the

means to provide for her own reasonable attorney fees and costs
in this matter.
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24.

The Court finds that each party has incurred attorney

fees and costs in this matter. The Court is concerned about the
fees and costs incurred in this matter, the Defendant's attorney
fees totalling in excess of $38,000.00, voluntarily decreased to
$28,000.00 by her counsel, and expert fees of CPA Merrill Norman,
exceeding $27,500.00.

The Plaintiff's attorney fees exceeded

$15,800.00, and his expert fees are somewhat less than that.
25.

The Court finds there is no need for the Court to rule

upon the reasonableness of the fees and costs in this matter.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
adopts its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded a Decree of

Divorce from the other upon grounds of irreconcilable
differences.
2.

As the Court has previously ordered, and pursuant to

the premarital agreement, each party has relinquished any and all
rights to any property accumulated by the other prior to the
marriage, and such premarital property will not be deemed to be
a marital asset of the parties following the marriage, including
any increase of value or interest acquired by that property after
the marriage.

The Court further rules that any property accumu-

lated by the parties "either individually or jointly, following
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the marriage, will be deemed marital property, and any portion of
premarital funds used to acquire the marital property will be
reimbursed at its original investment value, with any appreciated
values to be divided between the parties as marital assets."
3.

The Court holds that the premarital agreement clearly

sets forth the property rights of the parties and identifies as
marital property that property accumulated during the marriage
with either personal or marital funds, less that amount each
spouse expended to acquire said property.

The Court's decision

is made in accordance with the premarital agreement, the expert
testimony of the parties, and other evidence received by the
Court in this matter.
4.

Plaintiff, Anthony W. Rudman, is ordered to pay to

Defendant, Evelyn W. Rudman, temporary alimony in the sum of
$1,100.00 per month commencing with the month, June, 1989, and
continuing on the 5th and 20th day of each month until the
Defendant reaches the age of Social Securuity retirement, age 65,
or dies.

This is intended to return the Defendant to the

position she was in prior to the marriage to the Plaintiff.
5.

Plaintiff should be awarded as his sole and separate

property those assets of premarital ownership he held prior to
this marriage and the marital assets including, but not limited
to:
The condominium at 2560 Elizabeth Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah; the trailer park situated on 14 acres of land in Scofield
11

Utah; the 10.4 acres of Scofield land and the cabin situated
thereon; the proceeds received from the sale of the Douglas
Street triplex and Bonus Office Building sale; the Defendant's
one-half interest in Westates Partnership, including the
partnership's interest in the screens at Soda Springs, Mountain
Home, Rupert, Preston, Burley, Caldwell, and Pocatello, Idaho;
the Elko and Ely screens in Nevada; the Davis Drive-in, known as
the Cinema Corp., and the triangle section of land acquired
during the marriage; the Redwood Capitol and Cinema I screens in
Logan, known as Cache Amusement, Inc., the Cinema II and Cinema
III screens, also known as Cache Amusement, Inc.; the screens in
Monticello, Mt. Pleasant, Roosevelt, and Ephraim, Utah; the nine
(9) screens in St. George known as Movies I, II, and III; the
Gaiety, the Dixie, and the Starlight and the Cinema's I, II and
III; the screens in Jackson and Lymon, Wyoming; the West
Yellowstone, Montana screen; the Plaintiff's one-half interest in
the condominium at St. George, Utah; Plaintiff's 80% ownership in
the corporation known as T.T.& S.; all proceeds and interest
Plaintiff owns in Trolley Theatres, Trolley North, Trolley
Corners, Trolco and the proceeds from the sale of Trolley Square;
the St. George Bloomington Lot; the Jeep Wagoneer; the 1975 Dodge
truck and camper; the 1974 Ford horse truck; Plaintiff's jewelry;
Plaintiff's bank accounts; the two horses; all of the furniture,
furnishings, fixtures, and appliances presently in the
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Plaintiff's control wheresoever situate; and all of his
premarital bank accounts associated with each of the business
entities.
6.

Defendant should be awarded as her sole and separate

property the home at 1515 Sumac Drive, Logan, Utah; the proceeds
received from the sale of the Diet Center business; the Merry
Maids business; the 1500 shares of Techno-Lab, Inc. stock; the 50
shares of Prudential Financial Services stock; all of the
furniture, furnishings, fixtures, and appliances presently in her
possession and under her control; her bank accounts and her
personal effects and belongings.
7.

The Plaintiff should pay to the Defendant the sum of

$26,305.50 to equalize the division of the marital assets in this
matter.
8.

Plaintiff, Anthony W. Rudman, should assume and pay

and hold the Defendant, Evelyn W. Rudman, harmless from all debts
and obligations against all of the properties awarded the Plaintiff
in this matter, including the I.R.S business debt secured against
the Plaintiff's condominium, together with any and all debts and
obligations he has incurred in his own name since the filing of
the Complaint in this matter.
9.

Defendant, Evelyn W. Rudman, should assume and pay and

hold the Plaintiff, Anthony W. Rudman, harmless from all debts
and obligations against all of the properties awarded the Defendant
in this matter, together with any and all debts and obligations
13

she has incurred in her own name since the filing of the
Complaint in this matter.
10.

Plaintiff and Defendant should each be awarded their

own life insurance policies to do with as they choose.
11.

Plaintiff should cooperate in the transfer of the

current health, accident and hospitalization coverage to the
Defendant for her benefit under the Federal COBRA legislation.
Defendant should assume and pay all monthly costs associated with
that coverage for the three years provided by the federal law.
12.

The parties should each assume and pay their own

attorney fees and costs incurred in this matter.
13.

The parties are ordered to execute any and all

documents necessary
fo3:;th the intent of this Order.
:essary to carry forth
DATED thj
lis ^P'

day o f - J w ^ T 1989.
V

BY THE COURT:

V

APPROVED AS TO FORM THIS

m&k

"LEONARD H. RU

DAY OF JUNE, 1989.

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY

I hereby certify that 7 caused to be hand delivered
this

p^7

day of Jun<

. rid S. Dolowitz,

•

Attorney for Defendant, 525 East

: South, Fifth Floor,

Salt Lake City UT 84147.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

M?

STATE OF UTAH

7-s ej

ooOoo

/ 00 /or*

ANTHONY W. RUDMAN,
Plaintiff,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
v.
EVELYN W. RUDMAN,

Civil No. D87-1691
Judge Leonard H. Russon

Defendant.
ooOoo

This matter having come on regularly for trial on April 4,

of *:*•-? Judges or trie 3LHAH-HIV n . d

, :u

, rlaintifi, ANTHONY ->

RUDMAN, appearing IT person a^d hy a d *-;r ^: - -*:- /rone;., : aul

an:
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and through her attorney, David S. Dolowitz, and the

parties and expert witnesses having been duly sworn and examined
uiidhM
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received
since
claim,

by

the
and

the C o u r t ,

filing

and m o r e

of P l a i n t i f f ' s

the Court

having

than

three months

Complaint

requested

havinc

and D e f e n d a n t ' s

written

argument

nuik • ! "nl
elapsed
Counter-
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tvioh

party and having inquired into the legal sufficiency of the evidence
so adduced, and the Court having made and entered herein its written
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
as follows:
1.

The Plaintiff and Defendant be and they are hereby

awarded a Decree of Divorce from the other upon the grounds of
irreconcilable differences, with said Decree to become final upon
signing and entry.
2.

Plaintiff, Anthony W. Rudman, be and is hereby ordered

to pay to Defendant, Evelyn W. Rudman, as temporary alimony the
sum of $1,100.00 per month in two equal amounts on the 5th and
20th day of each month commencing July 5, 1989 and continuing
until Defendant reaches the age of Social Security retirement,
age 65, or dies.
3.

Plaintiff, Anthony W. Rudman, be and is hereby awarded

as his sole and separate property those assets of premarital
ownership he held prior to this marriage and the marital assets,
including, but not limited to:
The condominium at 2560 Elizabeth Street, Salt Lake

City,

Utah; the trailer park situated on 14 acres of land in Scofield,
Utah; the 10.4 acres of Scofield land and the cabin situated
thereon; the proceeds received from the sale of the Douglas
Street triplex and Bonus Office Building sale; the Defendant's
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as her sole and separate property, the marital and premarital
assets as set forth herein:
The home at 1515 Sumac Drive, Logan, Utah; the proceeds
received from the sale of the Diet Center business; the Merry
Maids business; the 1500 shares of Techno-Lab, Inc. stock; the 50
shares of Prudential Financial Services stock; all of the
furniture, furnishings, fixtures, and appliances presently in her
possession and under her control; her bank accounts and her
personal effects and belongings.
5.

The Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant the sum of

$26,305.50 to equalize the division of the marital assets in this
matter.
6.

Plaintiff be and is hereby ordered to assume and hold

Defendant harmless from all debts and obligations against those
properties awarded Plaintiff in this matter, including the I.R.S.
business debt secured against the Plaintiff's condominium,
together with any debts he has incurred in his own name since the
filing of the Complaint in this matter.
7.

Defendant be and is hereby ordered to assume and hold

Plaintiff harmless from all debts and obligations against those
properties awarded Defendant in this matter together with any
debts she has incurred in her own name since the filing of the
Complaint in this matter.
8.

The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to

assume and pay their own attorney fees and costs incurred herein.
4

9.

The parties be and they are each hereby awarded those

policies of life insurance on their life to do with as they
choose.
10.

Plaintiff is ordered to cooperate in effecting the

transfer of coverage under his health accident- a:: :
:-: *>..

hospitalization r^d
legislation.
•-.:

Defendant is

-

*>-*'.

ZCBR A

ordered t> a ^ur.e and Ld\ a x 1 premium

expenses for that coverage for the three years of

time as provided by the federal 1 aw.
11.

The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to do

M J perform

-

l

6 and things required by each of them

to be done herein,
DATED this

_C£_
clay o£p*»e/71989.
T
(s

BT'THF COURT!

/^^f^C
fRICT COUfiiT .FUDGE
D DISTRICT
onard H. Russon
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered a true
and correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE this

^O

day ot June, 14HS), In Urjvid S. Dolowitz, Attorney Tor Defendant,
525 East 100 South, Fifth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah.

<3^*-6J

5

^
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EXHIBIT E

EXHIBIT E

PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT

Agreement made this

h

day of April, 19 81,

between Anthony W. Rudman and Evelyn Mohr, both of Salt
I ake City, Utah.
WH ERE AS , th e p a i f: i es a re c o n te mp 1 a t i n g marriage
and establishing a home together as husband and wife? and
WH E RE A S , a in, th e r e q ue s t o £ E ve 1 y n M o h r b u t w i th
the :::: o m m o i i ag re e men t o £ b oth p ar t i e s th ey de s i re to e n t e r
into an agreement segregating the property accumulated by
e a ch o f th em p r i or to th e ma r r i age , s e p a r a t e £ r om th e i :i: una r :L t a 1
assets; a n d
W H E R E A S , they desire to make other provisions for
the w e l f a r e of Evelyn Mohr in the event of "the death of
Anthony W

Ri id ma n,; n ow , th e re f o re
IT IS AGREED A S F O L L O W S :
11

Each party hereby relinquishes and releases

to the other their heirs representatives and assigns every
right, claim and interest actual or contingent that: he or she
might have with respect to property accumulated by the other
prior to their marriage.

It is agreed that said property shall

not be deemed to b e a marital asset of 'the parties follow,] ng
the m a r r i a g e .
"This agreement is not intended and does not apply to
any property w h i c h is accumulated by 'the parties either individually
or jointly following the marriage of the parties.
Because of the mutual concern of the parties
t'oi the financial securi ty of Evel yn Mohr i r „ the event, of the
death of Anthony W

Rudma n

A nthon^ W

Ru iman

agrees to

purchase for Evelyn Mohr a life insurance policy in the
face amount of $200,000 with Evelyn Mohr to be the owner
thereof and to be an irrevocable beneficiary thereon and
he further agrees to maintain said insurance policy during
the period of the marriage of the parties.
3.

Anthony W. Rudman

owns a condominium at

2568 Elizabeth Street, #4, Salt Lake City, Utah.

It is

agreed that in the event of the death of Anthony W. Rudman
the outstanding mortgage balance on said condominium shall
be satisfied from the estate of Anthony Rudman and Evelyn
Mohr is given the right to live in said condominium during
her lifetime until her remarriage or until she voluntarily
moves.

At such time as Evelyn Mohr remarries or voluntarily

moves, the condominium will then pass to the heirs of Anthony
Rudman as provided in his will or by intestate succession
should he die without a will.
4.

It is not intended that this agreement will in

any way preclude either party from making provision for the
other party by way of gift, creation of joint tenancy, ownership of property, or by will.
DATED this

/ST

tl-

day of April, 19 81.

Everyn Mohr

Anthony Riidman
STATE OF UTAH

)
ss.

COUNTY OP SALT LAKE )
On the A£_"day of April, 19 81, personally appeared

before me Evelyn Mohr, s i g n e r of t h e foregoing Prenuptial
Ag reemeii t , wh o J u 1 y a ck now 1 e d ge d t o roe tha t s he e xe c u te d
the same.

Notary P u b l i c
Commission /Expires:

'Re s i d I n g I n S a 11 L ak e C o in 11y , Utah

fm/fi

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the

ss.
day of Apri!

^81

personally appeared

be f o re me An th on y Rudman, signer :: *.- n foregoing P r e n up t i a 1
Agreement, who duly acknowledged t: ne tha- * - executed the
same:.

Notary P u b l i c
Commission Expires:

CM M

R e s i d i n g i n S a l t Lake Coij111.;,- , Utah

EXHIBIT F

i *

M

h,LED

V H

IN CLERKS OFFICE

AUG 22 1988

EXHIBIT F

H. Dixon HUndley. Clerk 3rd Dist. Court

By •'&fi&{A/r\£M</l<i/.

•

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
TN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RUDMAN,

ANTHONY

RULING CLARIFICATION
CIVIL NO. D-87-1691

vs,
EVELYN W. RUDMAN,
Defendant

This matter came on for tri a] on August 18, 1988, At that
time,

a

prenupt lei 1 ..K.)reeitient wvih1

evidence.

and t'ece i yeei

Each party stipulated that t h e agreement

into b y both parties voluntarily
Each

f f ere- 1

party

asserted

unambiguous,

and that

matter" of 1 aw

and without duress

i nt-o

- i> entered
:- fraud.

that
t h e Court

of course

could

rule

- •

i n each par ty's favor..

its ruling, at w h i c h time both p a r t u s

nio"eii n

:

T h e Court gave
-i cont miidJK.e.

T h e trial w a s continued until October 13, 1 9 8 8 , at 10:00 a,m,
On

further

-• ::' e c t i o n ,

t h e court

herein

clarifies its

ruling.
The

said

prenuptial

agreement

clearly

provides

that

each

part"1/ lei inquishes -my Mini -ill! I. riqhl s t ;i 'my property accumulated
by t h e other party prior to t h e m a r r i a g e , a n d that

fi

said property

RUDMAN V. RUDMAN

shall

not

be

RULING CLARIFICATION
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deemed

to be

a marital

asset

of the parties

following the marriage."
The said agreement further clearly provides that the said
agreement as stated above shall not apply to "any property" which
is "accumulated" by the parties "either individually or jointly"
following the marriage of the parties.

The reasonable inference

from the entire agreement is that any property accumulated after
the marriage, whether accumulated individually or jointly, shall
be considered marital property.
The

question

arises, however,

concerning

acquisition

of

after-marriage accumulated property with before-marriage assets.
In Richlands Irrigation Co. v. Westview Irrigation Co., 96
Utah

403,

80

P.2d

458

(1938),

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

in

considering the definition of "accumulate" looked to Webster's
definition,

and

stated

that

such

definition

implies

restriction as to the source of such accumulation.

no

The court

stated:

Webster's definitions of "accumulate" as meaning
"to heap up in a mass; to pile up; to collect or bring
together; to amass; gather, store up, aggregate,
hoard," etc., imply no restriction as to the source,
means or methods of the accumulation. . . .
If the above definition were to be followed, the prenuptial
agreement

would

indicate

that

after-marriage

acquired

accumulation of property would be marital property regardless of

RUDMAN V. RUDMAN

its source.
clearly

PAGE THREE
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However, a fair reading of the prenuptial agreement

separates prior marriage property

accumulated after the marriage.

from that property

Therefore, this Court rules

that property accumulated prior to the marriage, including any
interest or increase in value of said property after the marriage;
remains the property of that individual.
However, where prior marriage property is merely rolled over
into another asset, even if done so after the marriage, such
remains the property of the original owner, and only that amount
in excess thereof constitutes property "accumulated" after the
marriage.
to

In other words, $10,000.00 in a savings account prior

the marriage

is not marital property,

regardless

of its

increase in value during the marriage, but if that $10,000.00 is
utilized to purchase common stock worth $10,000.00, while the
value of the stock of $10,000.00 is not marital property, any
increase in the value of that stock would be.

Any property

acquired after the marriage is marital, less that amount utilized
for its acquisition that can be traced to a point prior to the
marriage.
Dated this

of August, 1988.

EEDNARDHTRUSSON
>"\"
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ATTEST
H. DIXON Hi?>iDLEY
Cto.*

By -$ ^9jJ.'TldU,UY

RUDMAN V. RUDMAN
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

Ruling

following, this_

Clarification,

postage

prepaid,

__day of August, 1988:

Paul H. Liapis
Attorney for Plaintiff
48 Post Office Place, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
David S. Dolowitz
Attorney for Defendant
525 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

^

to the

